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Disrupting the South Africa Parliament; Performing Opposition 
1994-2010. 
 
 
Since 1994 opposition politics in South Africa has largely been viewed through the lens of ‘dominant 
party democracy’ theory.i There have been widespread warnings from political scientists that ‘the 
gravest danger to South African democracy [is] the lack of opposition to the ANC’.ii This literature largely 
focuses upon South Africa’s electoral politics and paints a gloomy picture. A situation in which the ANC’s 
electoral dominance is undisputed concerns those who wish to see South African democracy confirmed 
by the ‘turn-over’ test, whereby the party in government loses an election and allows power to pass 
peacefully to an opposition party. There are those that argue South African elections are ostensibly 
‘racial censuses’ in which the black majority votes for the ANC and the white, Indian and so-called 
coloured minorities vote for opposition parties replicating the societal divisions that apartheid created 
and maintained.iii There are others that argue that voters are not motivated by racial solidarity but 
rather that political parties have increasingly articulated and mobilised racial identities as a marker of 
difference in electoral politics in the context of a macro-economic consensus amongst all the main 
parties.iv This article shifts focus away from electoral politics directly and instead explores the quotidian 
dynamics of institutional disruption in the South African Parliament for what it can reveal about 
opposition politics in South Africa since 1994. The significance of legislative disruption within South 
African politics lies in the reminder it provides of the (always) ongoing transformation of parliament in 
the broader processes of South Africa’s ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’ of democracy. The institutional 
change marked by the 1994 elections did not just involve ‘the replacement of one shared cultural script 
by another’.v As Thelen has argued ‘institutional change’ is constituted by ‘incremental political 
struggles’, which in the case of the South African parliament are often visible in debates over 
disruption.vi 
Since 1994 the most common form of institutionally punished disruption seen in South Africa’s 
National Assembly has been individual MPs disregarding the authority of the chair and subsequently 
being ordered to withdraw from the chamber for the rest of the day’s sitting. This individualised form of 
disruption has nevertheless been powerfully inflected by the strong party ties of the National 
Assembly.vii More than once, the withdrawal of one MP has resulted in an opposition party walk-out. 
These moments are highly theatricalised ‘performances’ of political opposition, which is to say they are 
to varying degrees planned, stage-managed and ‘playing’ to an audience. Such performances are also 
‘performative’ in that they articulate embodied discourses such as gender, race and class. This article 
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explores the shifting dynamics of such ‘set-piece’ dramatisations of opposition and their relationship 
with the established analyses of political opposition in post-apartheid South Africa. It is argued that 
these disruptions are actually one of the principle means by which opposition political parties perform 
narratives of ANC dominance and as such require much more attention and critical engagement from 
political scholars. There have been two main styles of disruptive performance in the National Assembly 
since 1994 which are explored in the analysis which follows: firstly, performances of perceived political 
marginalisation, and secondly, performances that paradoxically lay claim to uphold parliamentary 
democracy through rule breaking, what I have termed here procedure-as-democracy.  
The article is divided into four parts. The first part sets out the institutional and wider political 
context of disruption in the South African parliament before turning specifically to examine orders to 
withdraw since 1994. The second part gives an overview of these orders to withdraw. The two 
remaining sections then explore more fully the use of disruption, firstly, to perform political 
marginalisation and secondly, to perform procedure-as-democracy. 
The Institutional and Political Context 
The ANC has won all four parliamentary elections held since 1994 with a huge majority: 62.6% in 1994, 
66.4% in 1999, 69.7% in 2004 and 65.9% in 2009. The idea that post-apartheid South Africa is a 
‘dominant party democracy’ has become firmly established in analyses of the South African parliament 
in light of these electoral results. There are what Roger Southall has called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ variants 
of the theory, but even those characterised as ‘weak’ rarely see much of a place for parliamentary 
opposition in South African politics in a situation where minority parties have no hope of being elected 
as an alternative government.viii There are those who argue instead that political opposition to the ANC 
and mechanisms for holding the government to account are to be found in the Constitutional Court, civil 
society, or inside the governing Tri-partite alliance itself.ix In this analysis the best hope for a viable 
parliamentary opposition lies in a future split of the trade union movement from its alliance with the 
ANC and the formation of an alternative political party which contests the ANC’s claim to represent 
South Africa’s black majority of voters. There are others who argue that the tasks of opposition are 
fundamentally altered by the ANC’s dominance, with its raison d’être becoming instead to ‘represent a 
diversity of interests’ and improve rather than knock-down government legislation.x So, in a situation in 
which the current parliamentary opposition is widely perceived to be, at worst, irrelevant and, at best, 
most sensibly directed towards co-operative governance, just how have opposition political parties 
behaved? 
Since 1994 there have been a number of twists and turns in the story of opposition politics in 
South Africa, which will briefly be sketched out here. The post-apartheid political landscape was 
fundamentally shaped by the protracted negotiations which followed De Klerk’s unbanning of the ANC 
and other liberation organisations in February 1990. In the negotiation process ‘the ANC acknowledged 
a balance of power in which the NP retained control of the state apparatus and security forces until the 
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elections, and thereafter, the basic personnel of those structures would remain unchanged’.xi The 
material result of this compromise was the Government of National Unity - a coalition government in 
which cabinet seats were allocated on the outcome of the 1994 elections, this saw the ANC (252 seats), 
and its erstwhile enemies the National Party (82 seats) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (43 seats) 
governing together in 1994.  Since 1994 South African elections have been based on a party-list 
proportional representation system with no threshold for representation, so in 1994 there were four 
other parties represented in the National Assembly. The largest parties outside GNU coalition were the 
Freedom Front (9 seats) and the Democratic Party (7 seats), with the Pan Africanist Congress (5 seats) 
and the African Christian Democrats (2 seats) also represented. Even though the National Party was 
recognised as the official opposition, as a partner within the GNU it pursued a policy of ‘co-operative 
governance’. In 1996 De Klerk withdrew the National Party from the GNU but the party struggled to find 
its place in the opposition landscape. Giliomee et al have suggested that National Party politicians 
expected to be needed in the new dispensation, that the white civil service, security forces and business 
class would demand their presence but that in practice the establishment quickly adjusted to working 
with the ANC and in the eyes of the public the Truth and Reconciliation Commission destroyed the NP’s 
moral standing as ‘co-founders’ of the new system.xii  
In the first parliament the DP made a name for itself by pursing a ‘robust’ opposition style.xiii The 
party made its stance very clear during the 1999 election, adopting its now infamous ‘fight back’ slogan, 
which many saw as galvanising opposition to the ANC in racial terms; as Maloka has described it, in this 
election the DP ‘positioned itself as an effective mouthpiece and custodian of white minority 
interests’.xiv After the election in which the DP won 38 seats, the ANC reportedly warned its members 
that the DP’s effective use of questions in parliament might have contributed to its success.xv The IFP 
and the (New) NP saw a decline in their fortunes in 1999 winning 34 and 28 seats respectively – widely 
interpreted as a rejection of their ‘co-operative’ opposition strategies. Nine other smaller parties won 
seats. In this context in June 2000 the New National Party and the Democratic Party announced a 
coalition they called the Democratic Alliance. However, by November of 2001 this coalition had ‘sprung 
apart’ again.xvi NNP leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk led an ‘exodus’ of senior NNP politicians from the 
DA first into a ‘consensus on policy issues’ with the ANC before eventually joining them after the 2004 
election.xvii   
The DA has subsequently consolidated itself as the official opposition and continued to modestly 
increase its share of the vote in the 2004 elections in which it won 50 seats and then in 2009 when it 
won 67 seats. Its stance and tactics altered slightly after 2007 when Helen Zillie, then major of Cape 
Town was elected party leader, and thus became in her words ‘the only leader of an opposition party in 
government’.xviii This position was strengthened when the DA also won the provincial elections in the 
Western Cape in 2009 and Zillie became Premier of the Western Cape. There are clearly both risks and 
benefits for the party in straddling a role in government and opposition as it now does. Zillie’s agenda as 
leader of the DA has generally been one of broadening the party’s appeal. In this context the DA’s 
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appetite for alliances has continued apace, in 2010 they announced an agreement with the Independent 
Democrats which led to Patricia De Lille standing as the DA’s candidate for Major of Cape Town in 2011 
and winning. In October 2011 the National Assembly became the showcase for this strategy when, with 
Zillie and De Lille’s backing, Lindiwe Mazibuko, a young (31 years old) black woman, was elected as 
parliamentary leader of the DA. These developments occurred whilst this article was being written and 
as a result are not considered in-depth here. Mazibuko significantly breaks the mould of DA leadership 
to date. It is a tantalizing question as to how her leadership style and participation in disruption in 
parliament might differ from her predecessors. 
2007-8 also witnessed what many at the time saw as the most significant development in 
opposition politics since 1994: a splinter from the ANC following Jacob Zuma’s election as ANC leader 
and Thabo Mbeki’s resignation (or recall) from the Presidency in 2007. The Congress of the People 
formed towards the end of 2008, just in time to contest the 2009 elections with some success (winning 
30 seats). Analysing its early policy documents Susan Booysen identified that COPE focused on 
‘procedural issues’, holding the ANC up to its own standards and ‘its truthfulness to the foundational 
principles of South African democracy’.xix  However, since 2009 COPE has disintegrated somewhat with 
some members defecting back to the ANC and a damaging power struggle between its two leading 
founders emerging.xx In 2004 there were 12 parties in total that won seats in the National Assembly, and 
2009 there were 13. The official opposition and the third party (the IFP in 2004, COPE in 2009) thus 
continued to operate in what might be typified by those looking for a single, strong alternative party as a 
‘fragmented’ opposition landscape.   
Robert Schrire has argued that in this context there are three possible opposition styles open to 
South African political parties: ‘robust’, ‘co-optive’ and ‘co-operative’.xxi By its very nature the outright 
disruption of proceedings of the National Assembly which results in an order for an MP to withdraw 
from the chamber does not fit easily into this schema. The classification is not all that helpful in 
unpicking the dynamics of such disruption nor does it help to capture the performative, symbolic 
aspects of these political acts.  
Punished Disruption: An Overview 
The rules and orders of the National Assembly in 1994 were largely those of the previous parliament, 
from which anything unconstitutional or not applicable to the new bi-cameral legislature was removed. 
During the first parliament, these initial rules were then amended by the Rules Committee (chaired by 
the Speaker of the National Assembly) so as to comply with the 1996 Constitution and to reflect the 
democratic ethos of the new parliament. In this spirit, the first amendment in May 1994 made 
parliamentary committees automatically open to the public unless a committee specifically decided 
otherwise. During this time the rules concerning members’ behaviour and disciplining were not 
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significantly changed, apart from the incorporation of a member’s right to freedom of speech.xxii Rule 51 
of the Rules of the National Assembly on ‘member ordered to withdraw’ states that: 
51. If the presiding officer is of the opinion that a member is deliberately contravening a 
provision of these rules, or that a member is in contempt of or disregarding the authority of the 
Chair, or that a member’s conduct is grossly disorderly, he or she may order the member to 
withdraw immediately from the chamber for the remainder of the day’s sitting.xxiii  
Rule 53 further states that a member ordered to withdraw must withdraw from the precincts of 
parliament.xxiv The continuity of rules however belies the ongoing contestation surrounding norms of 
behaviour in the post-1994 parliament. What is clear from MPs’ accounts of the early days of the new 
parliament is that the use of parliamentary rules and procedure was a point of tension between political 
opponents. For example, one ANC MP told Hannah Britton about the culture shock she experienced 
entering parliament for the first time: 
I remember the first day in the chamber. And here came these other people in the parties. And 
they were coming in here with motions and motions and one after the other. And the way we 
were quiet! We didn’t like this, but what does one do? How could we stop it? The air was 
tension. We all looked around, “What is this? What is happening?” But when we left the 
chamber we said, “This must never happen again!” Because I saw [members of parties within 
the previous government] enjoying it. They had caught us. We didn’t know the rules of 
parliament, the procedures of all that.xxv 
 
Whilst all new members of institutions undoubtedly experience culture shock the entry of anti-apartheid 
liberation movements into the former seat of white power and privilege in 1994 was a particularly 
emotional and fraught process which lent disruption and its punishment heightened figurative 
resonance.  
A statistical overview of members’ behaviour and the Presiding Officers’ use of disciplinary 
powers, complied from the Minutes and Proceedings of the National Assembly are set out in Table 1. 
During the first democratic parliament, between the years 1994 and 1999, 9 MPs were ordered to 
withdraw from the chamber. These instances were concentrated in the later half of the parliament; the 
first order to withdraw was not given until March of 1996.  In the second parliament between 1999 and 
2004 no orders to withdraw were given – although a larger volume of MPs withdrew remarks following 
a ruling from the Chair.  In the third parliament between 2004 and 2009 9 MPs were ordered to 
withdraw. At the time of writing, in the fourth democratic parliament two MPs have been ordered to 
withdraw from the chamber. Statistics on ‘personal explanations’ over the same period show a dramatic 
decrease after the first parliament. A tentative suggestion from this picture is that rule-breaking may 
have become more purposeful. 
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In every case except one the members asked to withdraw have been men (see Table 2). The only woman 
ordered to withdraw from the chamber was also an exception as the only member of the ANC. In the 
first two parliaments MPs asked to withdraw were most often members of opposition parties of the 
right-wing, the Freedom Front, Inkatha Freedom Party and National Party but the last two parliaments 
have seen more MPs ordered to withdraw who are from the liberal/conservative, Democratic Alliance, 
by then the largest opposition party in the National Assembly.  Petrus Johannes Groenewald from the 
Afrikanner nationalist party the Freedom Front (Plus) has been the MP most often expelled: he has been 
ordered from the chamber four times since 1994. Groenewald, as a member of the last white parliament 
prior to 1994 was also ordered to withdraw from that chamber twice between 1990 and 1994.  
 
Table 2. List of Members Ordered to Withdraw from the National Assembly 1994-2010. 
28
 
March 1996 – Rev. M Abrahams (IFP) 
13 March 1997 – Dr WA Odendaal (NP) 
22 May 1997 – Mr MA Mncwango (IFP) 
28 February 1998 – Mr A Fourie (NP) 
10 March 1998 – Mr AJ Leon (DP) 
20 August 1998 – Mr PJ Groenewald (FF) 
31 August 1998 – Mr A Williams (NP) 
24 March 1999 – Mr NM Muendane (PAC) 
25 March 1999 – Mr PJ Gronewald (FF) 
11 November 2004 – Mr MJ Ellis (DA) 
 
22 June 2005 – Mr EW Trent (DA) 
13 October 2005 – Mr CM Lowe (DA) 
AND – Mr M Waters (DA) 
16 November 2005 – Ms MP Mentor (ANC) 
20 June 2006 – Mr PJ Groenewald (FF) 
8 November 2006 – Mr JH Van Der Merwe (IFP) 
5 September 2007 – Mr M Waters (DA) 
12 February 2009 – Mr PJ Groenewald (FF) 
16 February 2010 – Mr M George (COPE) 
11 November 2010 – Mr D Maynier (DA) 
 
 
Table 1. Apologies and Withdrawals in the National Assembly 1994-2010. 
Parliament Personal Explanations Withdrawal of 
Remarks 
Order to Withdraw 
from Chamber 
1994-1999 16 15 9 
1999-2004 6 30 0 
2004-2009 2 11 9 
2009- present 0 2 2 
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In Table 3 below the reason for withdrawal in each of these cases has been identified in general 
terms. Clearly some incidents are more complex than others and what is set out here is the Presiding 
Officer’s stated reason for ordering the MP in question to withdraw, although an MP’s behaviour 
surrounding the immediate confrontation will also be important. One incident discussed in detail in 
section four serves as an example of the complexity of identifying the reason for the order to withdraw. 
Mike Waters was ordered to withdraw in September 2007, an incident I have classified as ‘challenging 
behaviour’ because the Speaker ordered Waters to withdraw when he continued to argue with her 
decision. However, the incident arose due to the Speaker’s judgement that a question Waters asked was 
out of order. Hence it might also have been classified as ‘not following procedure’. Table 3 thus 
functions as a rather crude overview that should be treated with caution. 
 
 
 
 
At least one insight does seem to emerge from this overview: the prevalence of un-
parliamentary remarks leading to orders to withdraw. Interestingly, the incidents of un-parliamentary 
remarks mostly took place in the first parliament of the democratic era (1994-1999). It seems that in the 
early years when co-operative governance held sway in the GNU, orders to withdraw largely concerned 
personal animosity or attacks of a personal nature. Three concerned personal attacks about the 
apartheid-era conduct of a fellow MP or politician. Five involved use of racist language, or one member 
calling another ‘racist’. In this respect they involved conflict over the boundaries of acceptable debate in 
post-apartheid South Africa. In the third and fourth parliament issues of discipline, physical behavior and 
following procedure, came to the fore as the personnel involved shifted too. The withdrawals in the 
third and fourth parliaments have tended to centre on the issue of punishment being perceived as 
unfair by opposition politicians. 
Table 3. Reasons that MPs have been asked to withdraw from the chamber since 1994. 
Reason for Order to Withdraw Number of Instances 
Un-parliamentary remarks made during debate 12 
Heckling 3 
Not following procedure, eg. Attack made on 
member without substantive motion 
3 
Challenging Behaviour eg. Won’t sit down 2 
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However, a discourse on disruption and unfair punishment within parliament first rose to public 
prominence between 1997 and 1999, not following an order to withdraw but during a legal battle 
between PAC MP Patricia De Lille and the first Speaker Dr Frene Ginwala outside parliament. On 
October 22 1997, De Lille, an MP for the PAC, a rival liberation organisation to the ANC, named a 
number of senior ANC members as being apartheid-era spies in the National Assembly. She was 
instructed to stop by the Speaker on the grounds that ‘making unsubstantiated allegations against the 
integrity of any member is un-parliamentary’.xxvi De Lille followed the Speaker’s order and withdrew the 
remarks. In the National Assembly chamber De Lille’s comments provoked ‘a state of uproar’ in the 
government benches but after her withdrawal of un-parliamentary remarks the incident might have 
rested there.xxvii However, the following day the ANC Chief Whip gave notice that he would propose a 
motion that De Lille’s behaviour be investigated by an Ad-Hoc parliamentary committee. Such a 
committee was established despite cross-party opposition protests that ‘because De Lille had withdrawn 
her statements there was nothing to investigate’.xxviii The committee recommended that De Lille be 
suspended for 15 days, a decision she chose to appeal through the courts.  
In two court cases, first at the Cape High Court and then the Supreme Court, De Lille won and 
her suspension was overturned.xxix Whilst the incident had involved no procedurally disruptive 
behaviour on the part of De Lille it had been deemed figuratively disruptive by parliamentary 
authorities. The ANC argued she had ‘undermined the dignity of the House’ and ‘made a mockery of 
parliamentary privilege’.xxx However, in his August 1999 judgement, Chief Justice Ismail Mohamed 
found that whilst ‘the National Assembly was empowered by the Constitution to control its internal 
arrangements and proceedings [and] this included the power to suspend from the Assembly, for 
temporary periods, any MP who was disrupting or obstructing its proceedings. It did not follow from this 
that the Assembly necessarily had the authority to suspend De Lille when she was not disrupting 
proceedings. It was clear that De Lille was suspended “as some kind of punishment” for her statements, 
which had not disrupted parliament’.xxxi This case was a very important backdrop for the incidents 
considered here. It confirmed that in South Africa, parliament was subordinate to the Constitution and 
that its internal affairs were subject to judicial scrutiny. It provided evidence that in this incident the 
ANC had apparently used its procedural power within parliament to punish a political opponent. Finally, 
it also established individual conflict or a show-down with the ANC as a means of constructing a media 
profile for an opposition politician. De Lille was framed positively in media discourses in a way which 
drew heavily on the memory of Helen Suzman and was presented as a principled lone crusader against 
an arrogant government. 
A perceived partiality of the Speakership and an accompanying discourse on unfair punishment 
intensified under the second Speaker Baleke Mbete. Mbete, who was Speaker from 2004 became in late 
2007 National Chairperson of the ANC, head of the ANC’s Political Committee; a combination of roles 
that many saw as compromising the desired neutrality of the Speakership.xxxii However, the assumption 
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of ‘Westminster’ norms on neutrality was something that Mbete herself rejected. In 2006 following a 
debate on her conduct she argued in parliament that: 
It is wrong to assume that our system is the same as Canada or the House of Commons or 
wherever because this is South Africa. In fact here we have decided that we [the Speaker] 
remain political. I remain a member of the ANC caucus and I go to it, unlike in Lesotho where the 
Speaker is not even a member of parliament.xxxiii 
 
The Speakership became a key battleground for contesting ‘Westminster norms’ and the scope and 
tenor of ANC power within parliament. Orders to withdraw, as we shall see became a crucial weapon in 
this battle. The discourse on unfair punishment during the third parliament was also linked with much 
broader discussions of the ethical behaviour of MPs. Since allegations first surfaced in the late 1990s a 
number of MPs, mostly from the ruling ANC have been implicated in what has become known as 
Travelgate, an investigation into MPs misuse of travel vouchers given to them for carrying out official 
business. The last of 30 MPs to be investigated was convicted of theft only in September 2009.xxxiv 
Apparent leniency towards these MPs, indeed Mbete was actually accused of protecting some from 
investigation, has formed a very important part of discussions of appropriate behaviour for MPs.xxxv 
Opposition parties have also complained that the ANC dominates the chamber of the National Assembly 
as part of their justification for disruption. Opposition MPs express unhappiness that the ANC drown out 
other speakers with noise, sometimes controversially animal noises, that they apparently ‘bus in’ party 
supporters to fill the public gallery during important debates and that the gallery joins in the clapping, 
singing, dancing and toyi-toying.xxxvi All of these complaints are important for opposition parties to 
contextualise their own disruptive behaviour as a response. The remainder of the article now goes on to 
explore in greater detail, firstly, instances of punished disruption which performed marginalisation and 
secondly, those which contested the upholding of procedure-as-democracy. 
Performances of Marginalisation 
In the mid-1980s the governing National Party introduced reforms in an attempt to shore-up white 
minority rule in the face of mounting internal and international opposition to apartheid. The result of 
these reforms was a tri-cameral parliament made-up of three chambers, each tasked with representing 
a different ‘community’. One chamber (with ultimate legislative authority) was elected by a white 
electorate, a second by an Indian electorate and a third by a so-called ‘coloured’ electorate. The tri-
cameral parliament saw very high incidents of withdrawals from the chambers of all three houses. 
Withdrawals were highest in the white chamber, the National Assembly, and concerned mainly MPs 
from the Conservative Party, the party which was then the Afrikaner nationalist party to the right of the 
National Party. These withdrawals peaked during the 1990s and were a feature of the very heated 
discussions surrounding the National Party’s ongoing negotiations with the then newly unbanned 
African National Congress (see Table Four). Members of the Conservative Party at that time complained 
that white rights were being sacrificed unnecessarily by the National Party, and their clashes with the 
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Speaker were expressive of feelings of marginalisation from the process of negotiations being led by the 
NP and ANC and their wish to express outright rejection of the transition process.xxxvii However, it may 
also be that withdrawals were a part of the quotidian culture of the tri-cameral parliament that 
reflected its ambivalent political status as a boycotted and discredited institution. In conversation, staff 
from the tri-cameral parliament suggested to me that if it was a sunny day an MP might provoke an 
order to withdraw in order to get the afternoon off work. This is a telling perception even if not 
necessarily verifiable. 
 
MPs who had also been members of the white parliament prior to 1994 were commonly amongst those 
ordered to withdraw during the first democratic parliament. It is perhaps interesting to note that other 
MPs who were former members of the white parliament whilst not always ordered to withdraw from 
the chamber after 1994, often involved themselves in discussions with Presiding Officers over 
rulings.xxxviii  It is argued here that the involvement of these men in incidents of punished disruption 
were indicative of a peculiar relationship with the new parliament; among its oldest members, well-
versed in parliamentary procedure but also ambivalent about participation in the new democracy, 
representative of minority views, and lacking in moral authority. It may also be the case that these MPs 
carried with them a culture of disruption from the tri-cameral era. The performances of certain MPs 
such as Petrus J. Gronewald might be viewed as part of a process Eghosa E. Osaghae has elsewhere 
noted as Afrikaner nationalists’, ‘transmutation into an aggrieved minority.’xxxix   
However, the position of all post-1994 MPs has not remained static and former members of the 
white parliament have taken different trajectories, some such as Marthinus Van Schalkwyk who became 
leader of the (New) National Party later joined the ANC (in 2004). One former Conservative Party 
member Koos van der Merwe, who was also one of those who was often ordered to withdraw from the 
tri-cameral parliament prior to 1994, and who was described by one parliamentary official to me as 
being a ‘real hard nut’ back then, has reinvented himself since 1994 as a jovial elder statesman of the 
House. His only brush with Rule 51 in the democratic parliament was performed in a more comical vein. 
He was in 2006 ordered to withdraw from the National Assembly after bringing a cake, complete with 
Table 4. Orders to Withdraw from Chamber 1985-1994: The Tri-Cameral Era 
Parliament House of Assembly House of 
Representatives 
House of Delegates 
1984 – 1989 27 9 10 
1989-1994 46 14 3 
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candle with him to a debate to, in his words, ‘celebrate’ the incompetence of the Office of the 
Presidency in making him wait for a whole year to be given an appointment with the President.xl 
However, returning to Groenewald’s rejection of successive Speaker’s rulings, there can be seen, 
I would argue, in both his language and behaviour an attempt to symbolically perform his own political 
marginalisation.  On 20 August of 1998 when the house was debating the Employment Equity Bill, which 
was a piece of legislation that instituted wide-ranging affirmative action to redress apartheid era 
discrimination, Groenewald would not withdraw his use of the word ‘racist’ to describe the Act and the 
Minister proposing it.xli A few days later, on 27 August, the Speaker ruled unequivocally that ‘it is never 
parliamentary to call another member racist, regardless of the context’.xlii In this instance, when 
Gronewald refused to withdraw his comments the rest of his party, the Freedom Front, followed him 
from the chamber in a performance of marginalisation. General Viljoen, leader of the FF, described this 
at the time as ‘exercising the strongest form of parliamentary protest’. However, the House Chairperson 
saw things a little differently saying that others should ‘not assist those attempting to wreck the 
decorum of the House’.xliii This incident certainly fits the patterns of behaviour displayed by the 
Conservative Party in the tri-cameral era, using a stand-off provoked by un-parliamentary language to 
stage a walk-out. The issue in question, affirmative action, is also noteworthy as one of the touchstones 
of what Steyn and Foster call ‘white talk’, a set of discourses whereby whiteness seeks to ‘maintain its 
advantages in a situation in which black people have legally and legitimately achieved political power’.xliv 
Groenewald does not deploy some of the more subtle discursive practices Steyn and Foster have 
identified to criticise the Employment Equity Act, instead he chooses to demonstrate outright rejection 
by using the term ‘racist’ and a wish to be seen to be, literally, forced out of parliament, and 
symbolically, the new South Africa. 
On 25 March 1999 when asked to withdraw remarks, Groenewald made an issue of being 
misunderstood as he spoke in Afrikaans.xlv  His defence may have been accurate but again it also had 
important symbolic resonance. As Osaghae has argued the Afrikaans language is a continued ‘rallying 
point’ for Afrikaaner nationalists and since the 1990s language rights have been both ‘a demand for the 
preservation of privileges as well as the basis for reconstructing a new Afrikaner identity’.xlvi 
Groenewald’s use of this defence was a means of dramatising Afrikaans as a threatened and 
misunderstood language and an assertion of his place as a defender of Afrikaans. In June 2006 after 
having referred to a Minister as a ‘racist’ and a ‘political criminal’, Groenewald argued, ‘Hon. 
Chairperson, as you have quoted me as I spoke the truth. I cannot withdraw the truth. I refuse to 
withdraw it’.xlvii In the latter two cases of withdrawal his use of un-parliamentary language is given a 
finesse not seen in the first two instances by the suggestion that his refusal to withdraw his remarks is 
honourable. In February 2009 after getting into trouble for saying the President had ‘acted like three 
little monkeys’, seeing, hearing and speaking no evil, he said, ‘I am a man of my word. I have said it, and 
I will not withdraw it.’xlviii When ordered to withdraw on this occasion he replied to the Deputy Speaker 
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‘I do so with honour Madam. Thank You’. In this last incident, ‘I am a man of my word’ Groenewald 
attempted to perform an explicitly masculine reasonableness. His assertion that he performed an 
honourable retreat criticised the Deputy Speaker’s own honour by implication and did so in a way which 
emphasised his own and the Deputy Speaker’s opposite genders.  
The Freedom Front (Plus) was a relatively small party in the National Assembly throughout this 
period; it had nine seats in the first parliament and currently has four.  According to the rules of debate 
whereby parties get allocated speaking time based on the number of seats they hold, it might be 
suggested that the FF+ simply makes creative use of its scant resources to garner media attention. 
However, there is undeniably a symbolic aspect to the incidents of withdrawal. In a recent interview 
with Victoria Hasson, one sitting MP from the FF+ complained that post-1994, Speakers were not 
enforcing the rules of parliament strictly enough. He said, ‘sometimes you want to make a point, you 
want to be chased out, you want to demonstrate total objection, rejection. I’ve tried that in the new 
dispensation; I couldn’t succeed’.xlix There is much that is revealing in this comment. Firstly, that some 
MPs wish to physically and symbolically perform, as opposed to simply stating, ‘total objection’. 
Secondly, certain MPs behavior in this way does seem to draw upon their experiences in the pre-1994 
parliament. In the disruptive performances of Petrus J. Groenewald parliamentary procedure is invoked 
to make visible in a physical display of expulsion a perceived figurative marginalisation and ambivalence 
about participation felt by some Afrikaners in the new South Africa. In these incidents the disrupters use 
the parliamentary space as a proxy for national space and perform political marginalization (or 
ambivalence) as a physical expulsion. These performances arguably had particular figurative resonance 
during the first parliament (two of Groenewald’s four expulsions occurred 1994-1999), when issues of 
inclusion/exclusion in the new South Africa were especially emotionally and politically contentious for 
Groenewald and his supporters. Liberal/conservative politicians’ performances of disruption, to which 
we will now turn, have been somewhat different. 
Procedure as Democracy 
Despite the greater number of withdrawals by Petrus J. Groenewald arguably the most spectacular and 
talked about incidents of withdrawal since 1994 have involved members of what has been since 2000 
the largest opposition party in the National Assembly, the Democratic Alliance. Two of these cases, one 
in October 2005 and a second in September 2007 have involved the DA MP Mike Waters. The second of 
these incidents is interesting for the speed at which it escalates from a ruling by the Speaker, rejected by 
opposition politicians, to a stand-off between the Speaker and Mike Waters resulting in an order for 
Waters to withdraw. In September 2007 Mike Waters asked a question pertaining to media reports that 
the Minister of Health had been convicted of theft in 1976 and whether she had disclosed this 
information to the President. Speaker Mbete immediately ruled that the question was out of order. 
Putting aside the issue as to whether this was a ruling commensurate with parliamentary rules (all 
rulings by presiding officers are based on interpretations of the rules following advice from Table Office 
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staff) the subsequent order to withdraw was made based on Water’s reaction to the ruling. The 
situation developed as follows: 
The SPEAKER: I have ruled the question by Mr Waters out of order, because it transgresses the 
rules and practices of the National Assembly, particularly Rule 63, which forbids the use of 
offensive or unbecoming language. It is patently clear from the question that was submitted by 
the hon. member that it reflected on the integrity of the Minister as it impugns impropriety on 
her part.  
 
As you know, it is established practice in this House that allegations against another member 
can only be brought before the House by way of a substantive motion, and such a motion should 
be properly motivated and substantiated. 
 
Members cannot be allowed to reflect on the integrity of others in the form of questions or 
other means other than through the mechanisms that this House has imposed upon itself. 
[Interjections.] So, I am not going to debate that issue with you, Mr Davidson. I have ruled the 
question out of order, and am not allowing a debate about the matter. Mr Davidson, I’d like you 
to take your seat regarding this matter. [Interjections.] 
 
Dr J T DELPORT: Madam Speaker, on a further point of order, may I suggest that the Chair is not 
in order by simply directing a member to take his seat when he is willing ... [Interjections.] 
 
The SPEAKER: Hon Delport, I also want you to take your seat, because I am not allowing a 
debate on Question 254, which I have ruled out of order and that is the end of that particular 
issue. [Interjections.] We now come to Question 298. [Interjections.] 
 
Mr M WATERS: Madam Speaker, as the person who submitted that question, could you refer 
me to the exact words which are unbecoming, please? 
 
The SPEAKER: Hon Waters, I have finished with the issue of Question 254. If there is nothing else 
you want to raise, I’d like you to take your seat ... 
 
Mr M WATERS: I would like you to direct me to those words ... 
 
The SPEAKER: I am not allowing you ... 
 
Mr M WATERS: ... that are unbecoming of an MP ... [Interjections.] 
 
The SPEAKER: Hon Waters, get out of the House. [Interjections.]l 
 
Still attempting to protest, Waters was ordered to ‘get out of the house’ a further six times before he 
left, at one point referring to the ANC party headquarters in his retort,  ‘Is that an instruction from 
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Luthuli House or from yourself?’ Once he had finally left, the Chief Whip of the ANC rose to say ‘Madam 
Speaker, I just wanted to warn people who want to wreck these proceedings that, for their own good, 
they must behave or leave parliament.’li Both parties were vying for the moral high ground.  
The next day the drama continued when Mbete suspended Waters from the House for 5 days 
describing his conduct as ‘outrageous, disrespectful and grossly disorderly’.lii The DA then staged a walk-
out in reaction to this ruling. Sandra Botha the DA leader in the House later told the media that ‘While 
the Speaker has the discretion to interpret parliament's rules, we believe her reasoning for first not 
allowing the question and then suspending Mr Waters holds no water; the only objective she achieved 
was to protect the minister from public scrutiny. The DA would not sit in the chamber today and form 
part of the Speaker's undermining of democracy. We had no option but to walk out in protest’.liii In this 
formulation, physical presence in parliamentary space was understood by the DA to confer legitimacy 
upon its practices – the DA conceived of itself as, in their own words, ‘defending democracy’ by walking 
out. The troubling visual picture of a largely white party ‘assuming the conscience of the nation’ is a part 
of a process Roger Southall describes slightly euphemistically as the content of opposition criticism 
becoming ‘blurred by the hurly-burly of insult, exchange, exaggeration and half-truth which, in SA as 
elsewhere, constitutes the negative aspect of party politics’.liv It might well be asked, as Gehard Maré 
has, what it means to continue to identify the whiteness of the opposition, but it might equally be asked 
what it would mean to ignore it.lv 
 It is clear that the Mike Waters incident was to a certain extent reactive and unplanned since it 
emerged after a particular ruling by the Speaker, however from the content of subsequent press 
releases in this case and others the DA was clearly aware that should they chose to protest over a 
procedural issue the resulting order to withdraw formed a compelling narrative. Indeed, orders to 
withdraw and the flurry of media reporting around them has been an effective tool for the DA to 
advance its narrative that the ANC does not respect parliament and that the DA is an upholder of 
democracy. Far from being seen as a disgrace, being ordered to withdraw seems to be viewed as a 
chance to perform as an honorable and principled MP. However such disruptions have to be performed 
carefully in order that they can be presented as a reasonable ‘reaction’, something that Steyn and Foster 
recognize as a feature of ‘white talk’ which obscures ‘its own aggressive impulses that initiate the 
dynamic’.lvi In such disruptions the DA must perform in such a way as to prevent its own commitment to 
South African democracy being questioned.  
In one of the latest withdrawal incidents that happened in February 2010 the performance was 
compromised when one of the DA MPs who took part in an opposition party walk-out after a Congress 
of the People (COPE) MP was ordered to withdraw, swore at the ANC. The initial incident had many of 
the same dynamics as the Mike Waters incident detailed above. On 16 February 2010 COPE MP Mluleki 
George was told that his statement that, ‘it appears that the nation is deliberately led into lawlessness, 
with absolutely no morals and respect for its people’, which he had made during the debate on the 
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President’s Address, was un-parliamentary.lvii The Deputy Speaker who made the ruling stated that, ‘It 
creates the impression that the President or his government is inciting lawlessness. Making 
unsubstantiated allegations about the integrity of any member is un-parliamentary’.lviii George 
defended his statement, saying that it was political and not an attack on an individual. The leader of 
COPE intervened, as did the DA’s Chief Whip saying that the Deputy Speaker was interfering with ‘the 
right to freedom of speech in the House’.lix COPE, the Independent Democrats and the DA proceeded to 
walk out following Mluleki George who was ordered to leave the chamber when he would not withdraw 
his statement. 
I was watching from the public gallery when this incident took place and the atmosphere in the 
chamber was loud and highly charged. When the opposition parties began to leave ANC MPs were out 
of their seats, chanting ‘go, go, go’, clapping and waving. In this hubbub of noise DA MP Dianne Kohler 
Barnard swore and was, amazingly, heard by a member of the ANC, who reported her to the Speaker.lx 
The following day the DA announced that she had been suspended by the party for 5 days, attempting 
to wrest back the moral high ground they had been in danger of losing through Kohler Barnards’s poor 
performance of the honourable retreat. Their statement again played the game of equivalences: ‘The DA 
believes in accountability and consequences, and that this action demonstrates our commitment to 
those principles. We challenge the ruling party to follow suit’.lxi In these arguments the imperative to 
discipline MPs was located within political parties rather than parliament as an institution 
demonstrating the extent to which parliamentary behavior had become a party political battleground. 
The DA did not want to leave the disciplining of Kohler Barnard to parliament, whose disciplinary 
procedures they were trying to call into question. 
Interestingly, despite the danger that the DA saw in leaving Kohler Barnard’s outburst 
unpunished or worse punished only by parliament, Kohler Barnard seems to have received a 
sympathetic reaction from sections of the white media and general public. In Die Burger the foremost 
Afrikaans-language newspaper Kohler Barnard was described in several reports as ‘fiesty’ or ‘fiery’.  Die 
Burger also described her as returning to parliament after her suspension, ‘dressed in fire-engine red, 
one of her favourite colours’.lxii The idea of Kohler Barnard as a no-nonsense, straight-talking woman 
was something she herself suggested in her explanation immediately after the incident: 
I am happy to apologise for swearing in the Assembly. I should not have done it. The portfolio I 
cover is a tough one and I am used to working in tough conditions and I do have a temper; so I 
do tend to use harsh language. But it will be typical of the ANC to make this molehill into a Table 
Mountain. They know I am their worst critic and they will try anything to get at me.lxiii  
 
A quick perusal of the internet comments left on the above mentioned article show that a number of Die 
Burger readers expressed a sense of solidarity with Kohler Barnard. There were a large number along 
the lines of ‘You Go Girl!!!Don’t let them get you down’.lxiv The incident was quickly picked up by the 
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South African chicken fast-food chain Nandos, who produced a print-advert that read: ‘Dianne, There’s 
only one place where it’s ok to use fowl language’. Kohler Barnard’s new found notoriety was reflected 
in their use of her first name only. In its reception this incident appears to overlap with the disruptive 
performances of Petrus J. Groenewald, in that members of the (white) public identified with Kohler 
Barnard’s disruption of parliamentary space as linked to a figurative disruption of the national space. 
Her outburst became a cathartic rejection of South African politics on their behalf. The racial politics of 
this are interesting to note. It was her performance and not Mluleki George’s initial defiance of the 
Deputy Speaker which received widespread media coverage suggesting perhaps that it is only white 
MP’s disruptive behavior that has strong resonance for some white South Africans.  
 However, the main aim of the DA’s disruptive performances, which Kohler Barnard 
compromised, appears to be to portray the ostensible rule-breakers (the DA) as more parliamentary and 
democratic than the rule-makers (the ANC). The most recent withdrawal is a case in point. On Thursday 
11 November 2010 the DA’s Shadow Defence Minister David Maynier was ordered to withdraw from the 
National Assembly. This particular performance was not about questioning the authority of the Speaker 
but trying to highlight the behavior of a Minister. The order to withdraw came at the culmination of a 
series of controversial parliamentary performances by David Maynier. He had been using successive 
Member’s Statements to read out sections of a report shown to the Defence Portfolio Committee, of 
which he is a member. The report was one which the Minister of Defence, Lindiwe Sisulu refused to 
publish, on the grounds that the report contained information sensitive to national security. Maynier 
made Member’s Statements on three successive occasions, reading out parts of the report and urging 
the Minister to publish it. Those ANC MPs present at the statements appeared unhappy about his 
behavior but did not challenge Maynier.lxv He kept conspicuously within the rules until the final 
statement he made on the subject on 11 November when he accused the Minister of telling ‘a political 
fib’ to the House. After taking some time to consider his ruling, at the end of the day’s sitting, amid an 
uncharacteristic hush in the chamber the Speaker ruled that this was tantamount to saying she lied, an 
un-parliamentary statement, and ordered Maynier to withdraw the statement. He ‘respectfully refused’ 
and left the chamber, taking care to bow elaborately to the Speaker but, I was later told, in his 
enthusiasm to leave, forgetting his brief case.lxvi  A statement from the DA Chief Whip Ian Davidson was 
released to the media soon after his withdrawal:  
The DA stands fully behind Shadow Defence Minister David Maynier MP, and the comments that 
he made in parliament today regarding Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu's handling of the 
National Defence Force Service commission report. 
Mr Maynier's expulsion from parliament, by Speaker Max Sisulu, is unacceptable. It is Minister 
Lindiwe Sisulu's behaviour that is un-parliamentary, and warrants rebuke. 
Minister Sisulu has repeatedly been uncooperative with parliament, contravening her 
constitutional duties to uphold the principles of accountability and transparency.lxvii 
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 Davidson said ‘it was only fair and right that such conduct was brought to Parliament's, and by 
extension, the South African public's attention’ hinting at the degree of calculation lying behind 
Maynier’s actions.lxviii To judge by these public pronouncements this disruptive performance was about 
attempting to present the rule-breakers as more parliamentary than their discipliners even though in 
this case the DA could hardly dispute that Maynier had in fact made an un-parliamentary statement. 
Performances such as this ostensibly place a high value on procedure, often evoking a Westminster ideal 
of a politically neutral Speaker or a ruling party ready and willing to be held accountable but they do so 
through breaking rules and through forms of behavior ironically rarely seen in Westminster itself.lxix 
Conclusions 
That South Africa post-1994 can be described as a dominant party democracy has become a widely-held 
view amongst academics. To what extent is this more than a truism of electoral politics? This article 
explores dominant party democracy theory as quotidian reality. One of the ways in which ANC 
dominance is made visible on a quotidian level is by opposition disruption. Both forms of disruption 
discussed here are evidence of opposition politicians and parties choosing to use symbolically resonant 
behavior rather than rational political discourse to voice opposition to the ANC government or its 
policies. Some might argue that this is because other opposition mechanisms are rendered useless in a 
dominant party democracy; that in a context in which they have no hope of governing opposition parties 
no longer see the point of behaving reasonably.lxx It is interesting to consider to what extent this is 
mediated for the DA by its position as a governing party on the provincial level. However, we might also 
note that it is in part through such disruptions that ANC dominance is constituted as a public discourse.  
Unpicking the symbolic content of opposition disruption since 1994 it becomes clear that more 
is at stake than political disagreement which has no other avenues for expression. Disruptions that 
perform marginalisation such as those of Groenewald and more recently Dianne Kohler Barnard 
symbolically articulate some white South Africans’ continuing ambivalence about participating in the 
new South Africa. These disruptions echo forms of behavior prevalent in the tri-cameral parliament and 
involve knowingly stepping outside the rules of parliament in order to be ‘chased out’. Disruptions that 
perform procedure as democracy are also performances which constitute dominant party democracy as 
a quotidian affect. They are not simply caused by ANC dominance as opposition discourses might have 
us believe but are patterned, normative forms of behavior in themselves. These incidents reveal an 
ongoing contestation of procedural norms in the South African parliament with the DA paradoxically 
evoking Westminster ideals such as Speaker neutrality through rule-breaking. This contestation has had 
troubling racial and gender dynamics to it, often dramatizing white male MPs as upholders of democracy 
in the face of the authority of black women Speakers. This is not necessarily to argue that critics of the 
ANC government should keep quiet if they happen to be white but rather to be attuned to the symbolic 
performances of disruption as choices made by the politicians involved. The reading advanced here has 
been one in which punished disruption highlights the difficulties of finding institutional scripts for 
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parliamentary behavior that are free from the exclusions of problematic universalist liberal norms. In 
South Africa the whiteness (and maleness) of legislative disruption which lays claims to defending 
democracy has an important, but unseen corollary. Hannah Britton’s study of the first democratic 
parliament in South Africa noted that the MPs most likely to leave parliament in 1999 were black 
women from ‘significantly disadvantaged educational and occupational backgrounds’ who had found 
themselves in parliament as a result of their grassroots political activism under apartheid.lxxi The women 
could seemingly not find the institutional support they needed in order to represent effectively within 
parliament. These women did not disrupt parliament however - they simply disappeared. 
This article has compiled the first statistical overview of punished disruption in the South African 
National Assembly and suggested that there have been two dominant styles of performing such 
disruptions. It does not present a comprehensive analysis of disruption and is certainly not the last word 
on those incidents considered here. It is hoped it will bring disruption to the attention of those who seek 
to better understand South African democracy as worthy of much further study.  
 
 
                                                          
i
 The Awkward Embrace; Southall, Opposition and Democracy in South Africa. 
ii
 Paremoer and Jung, “The Role of Social and Economic Rights in Supporting Opposition in Postapartheid South 
Africa,” 200. 
iii
 Giliomee, Myburgh, and Schlemmer, “Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa,” 
162. 
iv
 Habib and Taylor, “Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in post-Apartheid South Africa,” 216. 
v
 Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” 384. 
vi
 Ibid. 
vii Members of the National Assembly are elected by a proportional representation party list system, whereby 
seats are won by political parties not individual MPs. For a period between 2003 and 2009, ‘floor-crossing 
windows’ enabled sitting MPs to change their party affiliation and retain their seats, however, since 2009 any MP 
who resigns from their political party, loses their seat.   
viii
 Southall, “Emergent Perspectives on Opposition in South Africa.” 
ix
 Paremoer and Jung, “The Role of Social and Economic Rights in Supporting Opposition in Postapartheid South 
Africa”; Habib and Taylor, “Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in post-Apartheid South Africa.” 
Rachel E. Johnson (2013): Disrupting the South African parliament: performing opposition 1994–2010, 
Democratization, 20:3, pp.478-500. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
x
 Nijzink, “Opposition in the New South African Parliament,” 57. 
xi
 Pottie, “The Electoral System and Opposition Parties in South Africa,” 30. 
xii
 Giliomee, Myburgh, and Schlemmer, “Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa,” 
165. 
xiii
 Schrire, “The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences.” 
xiv
 Maloka, “‘White’ Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa,” 233. 
xv
 Nijzink, “Opposition in the New South African Parliament,” 65. 
xvi
 Lodge, Politics in South Africa, 158. 
xvii
 Ibid. 
xviii
 Jolobe, “The DA: Consolidating the Official Opposition,” 137. 
xix
 Booysen, “Congress of the People: Between Foothold of Hope and Slippery Slope,” 98. 
xx
 Ferreira, “Cope’s Coalition Talks ‘Reason’ for Dexter’s Defection.” 
xxi
 Schrire, “The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences,” 142. 
xxii Hahndiek, Parliament Since 1994: Achievements and Challenges, 82. 
xxiii
 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Rules of the National Assembly, 17. 
xxiv
 Ibid., 18. 
xxv
 Britton, Women in the South African Parliament, 64–65. 
xxvi
 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Annotated Digest of Rulings 1994-1999: 158. 
xxvii
 Scott, ‘No Interrogation, just six hours heat’, Cape Times, October 23, 1997. 
xxviii
 ‘Parliament to probe De Lille’s conduct’, Cape Times, October 28, 1997. 
xxix
 The judgement on De Lille’s case at the Cape High Court was delivered on May 8 1997 and at the Supreme 
Court on August 26 1999.  
xxx
 ‘Parliament to probe De Lille’s conduct’, Cape Times, October 28, 1997. 
xxxi
 The court’s judgement was front page news the next day. Koopman, ‘De Lille vs Ginwala verdict’, Cape Times, 
August 27, 1999. 
Rachel E. Johnson (2013): Disrupting the South African parliament: performing opposition 1994–2010, 
Democratization, 20:3, pp.478-500. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
xxxii
 Andrew Feinstein, an ex-ANC MP has subsequently described this as ‘an outrageous appointment...there was 
no way in which the Chair of the Committee that determines the ANC’s political strategy in parliament could 
possibly perform the role of Speaker in an impartial and non-partisan manner’. Feinstein, After the Party, 235. 
xxxiii
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard) Third Parliament, 3d session 
(September 12, 2006), Vol.96, Col 6721. 
xxxiv
 “DA Calls on Booi to Resign as MP.” 
xxxv
 Feinstein, After the Party, 235; Dawes, “Travelgate Facts ‘Misrepresented’.” 
xxxvi
 See for example, the complaints aired during a debate on an earlier disruption from the public gallery by FF 
supporters in 1997. Koos van der Merwe of the IFP accused the ANC of ‘bussing in their supporters, putting them 
in the public gallery, and shouting while we were speaking’. National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the 
National Assembly, Second Parliament, 1t session (October 28, 1997), Vol. 15, Col. 5550-5558. In 2009 at the first 
sitting of Parliament to elect the President and swear in members, Lynda Odendaal, a woman member of the new 
Congress of the People (COPE) party was heckled with “miaows” as she was sworn in. The ANC Chief Whip later 
agreed that this had been un-parliamentary. For a report of the sitting see Hendricks, ‘Parliament Elects Zuma’, 
May 7, 2009. 
xxxvii
 See for example proceedings on September 22 1993. Mr DP Du Pleiss of the Conservative Party at one point 
asked the President (FW De Klerk of the National Party) ‘I want to ask him in connection with those Afrikaners who 
are going to refuse to accept the communist, anti-Christian dispensation which he is planning for South Africa in 
co-operation with Joe Slovo and Nelson Mandela, whether he intends compelling them into it by force of arms’. 
Later the same day the Leader of the Opposition, called FW De Klerk ‘a traitor’, as did every member of the CP 
party individually, in turn, in order that they be ordered to withdraw from the chamber. Mr FJ Le Roux makes clear 
the party’s intentions when he stated immediately after the Leader of the Opposition had been asked to withdraw: 
‘Mr Speaker, on a point of order, I wish to draw to the Chair’s attention to the fact that all members of the CP 
caucus associate themselves with what the honourable Leader of the Official Opposition in this House has said. 
Without repeating everything, we associate ourselves fully with what he has said and we request the Chair to give 
the same order to all the honourable members of the CP’. Republic of South Africa, Debates of Parliament 
(Hansard), Ninth Parliament, 5t session, (September 22, 1993), Vol.43, Col.13515-13522. 
xxxviii
 The most extreme example of this dynamic was perhaps the instance on 17 September 1998 when following a 
heated exchange with the presiding officer, Andre Fourie of the National Party was summoned to come the Chair 
immediately after an adjournment. Members of the ANC unaware that Fourie had been summoned interpreted his 
approaching of the Chair as threatening behaviour and several MPs crossed the floor to intervene. In the ensuing 
scuffle Dr Manie Schoeman (NP) and Adv Johnny de Lange (ANC) punched each other. Schoeman (whom, video 
footage showed, had landed the first punch) was subsequently suspended for five days and De Lange (who 
retaliated) for one day. 
xxxix
 Osaghe, “What Democratisation Does To Minorities Displaced From Power: The Case of White Afrikaners in 
South Africa,” 307. 
Rachel E. Johnson (2013): Disrupting the South African parliament: performing opposition 1994–2010, 
Democratization, 20:3, pp.478-500. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
xl
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly, Third Parliament, 3d session, (November 8, 
2006), Vol. 97, Col.8346-8350.  
xli
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly, First Parliament, 2d session, (August 20, 
1998), Vol. 20, Col.5226-5237. 
xlii
 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Annotated Digest of Rulings 1994-1999, 156. 
xliii
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly, First Parliament, 2d session, (August 20, 
1998), Vol.20, Col.5237. 
xliv
 Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 26. 
xlv
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly, First Parliament, 4t session, (March 25, 
1999), Vol.25, Col.3417-3420. 
xlvi
 Osaghe, “What Democratisation Does To Minorities Displaced From Power: The Case of White Afrikaners in 
South Africa,” 310. 
xlvii
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly, Third Parliament, 3d session, (June 20 
2006), 39 
xlviii
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, Fourth Parliament, 1t session, (February 
12, 2009), 30-31. In the points of order surrounding Groenewald’s expulsion, the interventions of members of the 
former white parliament are particularly visible. Koos Van Der Merwe made the following speech: ‘Madam Deputy 
Speaker, on a further point of order: May I, with great respect, remind you that before you are to rule, you must 
listen to all the inputs in respect of the point taken. [Interjections.] It is the same as in a court case. You cannot 
make a decision before you have been addressed by all. So I suggest then that you allow all members who wish to 
make an input on that point of order, such as Dr Mulder, to make their input before you rule. Otherwise you may 
rule wrongly, because certain information was not given to you’. 
xlix
 FF+ MP in interview with Victoria Hasson, cited in Hasson, “Deliberative Tradition in Parliament of South Africa.” 
l
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly, Third Parliament, 3d session, (September 5, 
2007), 13-17 
li
 Ibid., 17 
lii
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, Third Parliament, 3d session, (September 
6, 2007), 5. 
liii
 ‘DA MP ejected from the Chamber’, Mail and Guardian, September 21, 2010. 
Rachel E. Johnson (2013): Disrupting the South African parliament: performing opposition 1994–2010, 
Democratization, 20:3, pp.478-500. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
liv
 Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 33; 
Southall, Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, 18. 
lv
 Maré, “Race, Democracy and Opposition in South African Politics: As Other a Way as Is Possible,” 95. 
lvi
 Steyn and Foster, “Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 33. 
lvii
 National Assembly of South Africa, Debates of the National Assembly, Fourth Parliament, 2d session, (February 
16, 2010), 25 
lviii
 Ibid., 26. 
lix
 Ibid., 29-30. 
lx
 Ibid., 30-31 
lxi
 Davidson, Statement on the suspension of Dianne Kohler Barnard, February 17, 2010. 
lxii
 Steenkamp, ‘F-Word puts MP on the map’, Die Burger, February 24, 2010. 
lxiii
 Du Plessis and Du Plessis, ‘F-Word slur in parliament’, Cape Argus, February 17, 2010, 1 
lxiv
 Comments left on, Steenkamp, ‘F-Word puts MP on the map’. 
lxv
 Based on personal observations from the National Assembly public gallery. 
lxvi
 These details are based on personal observations from the public gallery and discussion with parliamentary staff 
on the day of the withdrawal. 
lxvii
 ‘DA MP Ordered Out of the House’, November 12, 2010. 
lxviii
 Ibid. 
lxix
 See Armitage in this volume. 
lxx
 Southall, Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, 9. 
lxxi
 Britton, Women in the South African Parliament, 99. 
Booysen, Susan. “Congress of the People: Between Foothold of Hope and Slippery Slope.” In Zunami! : the South 
African Elections of 2009, edited by Roger Southall and John Daniel, 85–113. Auckland Park, South Africa :: 
Jacana Media,, 2009. 
Britton, Hannah Evelyn. Women in the South African Parliament: From Resistance to Governance. Urbana, Ill: 
University of Illinois Press, 2005. 
———. Women in the South African Parliament: From Resistance to Governance. Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois 
Press, 2005. 
Rachel E. Johnson (2013): Disrupting the South African parliament: performing opposition 1994–2010, 
Democratization, 20:3, pp.478-500. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“DA Calls on Booi to Resign as MP.” Mail and Guardian, September 29, 2009. http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-
09-29-da-calls-on-booi-to-resign-as-mp. 
Dawes, Nic. “Travelgate Facts ‘Misrepresented’.” Mail and Guardian, June 6, 2008. 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-06-24-travelgate-facts-misrepresented. 
Feinstein, Andrew. After the Party: Corruption, the ANC and South Africa’s Uncertain Future. 2nd ed. London: 
Verso, 2010. 
Ferreira, Emsie. “Cope’s Coalition Talks ‘Reason’ for Dexter’s Defection.” The M&G Online, n.d. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-01-04-copes-coalition-talks-part-of-the-reason-for-dexters-defection/. 
Giliomee, Hermann, James Myburgh, and Lawrence Schlemmer. “Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and 
Minorities in South Africa.” In Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, edited by Roger Southall, 161–
182. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Habib, Adam, and James Taylor. “Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in post-Apartheid South Africa.” 
In Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, edited by Roger Southall, 207–226. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Hahndiek, Kasper, ed. Parliament Since 1994: Achievements and Challenges. Cape Town: Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa: ABC Press, 2006. 
Hasson, Victoria. “The Role and Development of Deliberative Tradition in the Parliament of South Africa 1970-
2009”. PhD, University of Sheffield, 2011. 
Jolobe, Zwelethu. “The DA: Consolidating the Official Opposition.” In Zunami! : the South African Elections of 2009, 
edited by Roger Southall and John Daniel, 131–146. Auckland Park, South Africa :: Jacana Media,, 2009. 
Lodge, Tom. Politics in South Africa : from Mandela to Mbeki. 2nd ed. Oxford :: James Currey,, 2003. 
Maloka, Eddie. “‘White’ Political Parties and Democractic Consolidation in South Africa.” In Opposition and 
Democracy in South Africa, edited by Roger Southall, 227–236. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Maré, Gerhard. “Race, Democracy and Opposition in South African Politics: As Other a Way as Is Possible.” In 
Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, edited by Roger Southall, 85–102. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Nijzink, Lia. “Opposition in the New South African Parliament.” In Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, edited 
by Roger Southall, 53–68. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Osaghe, Eghosa E. “What Democratisation Does To Minorities Displaced From Power: The Case of White Afrikaners 
in South Africa.” Forum for Development Studies 2 (2002): 293–319. 
Paremoer, Lauren, and Courtney Jung. “The Role of Social and Economic Rights in Supporting Opposition in 
Postapartheid South Africa.” In After Apartheid: Reinventing South Africa?, edited by Ian Shapiro and 
Kathreen Tebeau, 199–230. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011. 
Pottie, David. “The Electoral System and Opposition Parties in South Africa.” In Opposition and Democracy in South 
Africa, edited by Roger Southall, 25–52. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Schrire, Robert. “The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences.” In 
Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, edited by Roger Southall, 25–52. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Southall, Roger. “Emergent Perspectives on Opposition in South Africa.” In Opposition and Democracy in South 
Africa, edited by Roger Southall, 275–284. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Southall, Roger, ed. Opposition and Democracy in South Africa. London: F.Cass, 2001. 
Steyn, Melissa, and Don Foster. “Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-apartheid South 
Africa.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 1 (2008): 25–51. 
The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy. Australia: Harwood Academic, 1999. 
Thelen, Kathleen. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 
369–404. 
 
